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Thompson, the Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges for the sole purpose of excluding blacks had the effect
of denying the defendant the right to an impartial jury.
In the area of products liability, the Court's decision in
Caprara v. Chrysler Corporation held that evidence of post-acci-
dent manufacturing changes is admissible in a strict products lia-
bility action, thus distinguishing such an action from one in negli-
gence where evidence of such changes has been held inadmissible.
The vitality of the doctrine of intrafamily immunity is explored in
Smith v. Sapienza, where the Court held that no cause of action
lies for the negligent supervision of a child by an unemancipated
sibling. The decision appears to reaffirm many of the policy consid-
erations in the Court's landmark decision in Holodook v. Spencer.
It is hoped that The Survey's analysis of these and other signifi-
cant New York decisions will serve the purpose of keeping the
practitioner informed of recent developments in New York law.
ARTICLE 78-PROCEEDING AGAINST BODY OR OFFICER
Conditional agency determination improperly brought under arti-
cle 78 will be converted into suit for injunctive relief under Public
Health Law
CPLR article 78, which provides for judicial review of admin-
istrative action, was designed to eliminate technical distinctions
among the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus to review,
and mandamus to compel by incorporating these writs into a uni-
form proceeding.' Distinctions among the writs persist, however,
CPLR 7801 (1981); see 5 N.Y. JUR. 2d Article 78 and Related Proceedings § 2 (1980);
SIEGEL § 557, at 774; WK&M 7801.02. See generally Gabrielli & Nonna, Judicial Review
of Administrative Action in New York: An Overview and Survey, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 361
(1978). Article 78 abolishes the common-law writs of mandamus to review, mandamus to
compel, prohibition, and certiorari and integrates them into one simple proceeding. See
Weintraub, Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Action:
From State Writs to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
86, 119 (1963). These writs originated under English common law and were carried over to
the American system. See Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative
Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478 (1963). Certiorari applies to the review of
an administrative determination resulting from a hearing required by law. See Long Island
R.R. v. Hylan, 240 N.Y. 199, 203-04, 148 N.E. 189, 190 (1925); Board of Educ. v. Parsons, 61
Misc. 2d 838, 839, 306 N.Y.S.2d 833, 836 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 1969); Gelces v. State
Liquor Auth., 154 Misc. 517, 517, 278 N.Y.S. 328, 329 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1935). The
requirement of a hearing may be implied from a statute, see Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y.
461, 468, 121 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1954), or derived from an administrative rule, see Adler v.
Lang, 21 App. Div. 2d 107, 111, 248 N.Y.S.2d 549, 553-54 (1st Dep't 1964). The hearing
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because the exhaustion of remedies doctrine codified within article
78 provides that nonfinal agency action is ripe for judicial review
only if the proceedings are in the nature of prohibition or manda-
mus to compel.2 Thus, absent final agency action, an article 78 pro-
must be of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, see People ex rel. Hayes v. Waldo, 212 N.Y.
156, 172, 105 N.E. 961, 966, rehearing denied, 212 N.Y. 588, 106 N.E. 1040 (1914), and not
the type of action that can be termed executive, see People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams, 185
N.Y. 92, 95, 77 N.E. 785, 785 (1906), ministerial, see People ex rel. Corwin v. Walter, 68
N.Y. 403, 411 (1877), or legislative, see National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 50 App. Div. 2d 817,
817, 376 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 361 N.E.2d 1028, 393
N.Y.S.2d 379 (1977). See generally N.Y. STATE ADMIN. PRO. ACT § 102(3) (McKinney Supp.
1980).
The writ of mandamus may be divided into two categories: mandamus to compel and
mandamus to review. The writ of mandamus to compel will be issued to compel an official
to perform a nondiscretionary duty "enjoined by law." See Horan v. Dominy, 43 Misc. 2d
62, 63, 250 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1964); Littefielcl-Alger Signal Co. v.
County of Nassau, 40 Misc. 2d 948, 950, 244 N.Y.S.2d 579, 582 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1963). The duty clearly must be ministerial and the power of the official to act already must
exist. See Burr v. Voorhis, 229 N.Y. 382, 387, 128 N.E. 220, 221 (1920). The issuance of the
writ does not require a prior agency hearing. See Mount Hope Dev. Corp. v. James, 258
N.Y. 510, 512, 180 N.E. 252, 252 (1932); People ex rel. Desiderio v. Conolly, 238 N.Y. 326,
330-31, 144 N.E. 629, 630 (1924); People ex rel. Republican & Journal Co. v. Wiggins, 199
N.Y. 382, 385, 92 N.E. 789, 790 (1910). The petitioner seeking mandamus to compel must
prove a clear legal right to the remedy. See Fehlhaber Corp. v. O'Hara, 53 App. Div. 2d 746,
746, 384 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (3d Dep't 1976); Jackson v. McCabe, 47 App. Div. 2d 730, 730,
365 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204 (1st Dep't 1975).
Mandamus to review permits judicial review of administrative decisions when the
agency is not required by law to hold a hearing. It is distinguishable from certiorari because
there is no legal requirement for a hearing and the agency is not required to base its deci-
sion upon substantial evidence. See 125 Bar Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 174,
177, 247 N.E.2d 157, 158, 299 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (1969). Thus, when an agency makes a
determination based upon information that it may receive in an informal fashion, manda-
mus to review will be used by the court to review the agency's determination. See Rochester
Colony, Inc. v. Hostetter, 19 App. Div. 2d 250, 253, 241 N.Y.S.2d 210, 213 (4th Dep't 1963).
The writ of prohibition will be issued when an agency exceeds its jurisdictional author-
ity. See generally Note, The Writ of Prohibition in New York-Attempt to Circumscribe
an Elusive Concept, 50 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 76 (1975). Since prohibition is considered an
extraordinary writ, see Proskin v. County Court, 37 App. Div. 2d 279, 282, 324 N.Y.S.2d 426,
429 (3d Dep't 1971), af'd, 30 N.Y.2d 15, 280 N.E.2d 875, 330 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1972), and is
issued in the discretion of the court, see LaRocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 579, 338 N.E.2d
606, 610, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, 97 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976), it will only be issued
when the petitioner demonstrates that he has no other viable remedy. See Schuyler v. State
Univ., 31 App. Div. 2d 273, 274, 297 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (3d Dep't 1969).
2 As Professor Siegel has stated:
The doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, embodied in the
requirement of CPLR 7801(1) that the determination be "final" before being sub-
jected to an article 78 proceeding, . . . means that if there are further (and rea-
sonable) administrative steps available to secure a change in the result, the party
must pursue them before going to court.
SIEGEL § 558, at 779. A proceeding in the nature of prohibition need not meet the finality
requirement because the contention of such a proceeding is that an administrative agency
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ceeding in the nature of certiorari or mandamus to review is im-
proper 3 and must either be dismissed4 or converted into an
alternative form of relief.5 Recently, in Hamptons' Hospital v.
Moore," the Court of Appeals held that the nature of an article 78
proceeding is a function of the character of the contested agency
activity.7 Nonetheless, upon sanctioning the conversion of an arti-
cle 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus to review into a cause
of action under the Public Health Law, the Court held that
governmental agencies may not be estopped from reversing their
conditional decisions.'
In Hamptons' Hospital, the Public Health Council (PHC)9
exceeded its jurisdiction, a matter that is reviewable at any time. See Civil Serv. Employees
Ass'n, Inc. v. Helsby, 31 App. Div. 2d 325, 330, 297 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (3d Dep't 1969). A
proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel need not meet the finality requirement
because the contested agency activity is ministerial. See Burr v. Voorhis, 229 N.Y. 382, 387,
128 N.E. 220, 221 (1920); People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners of Land Office, 149 N.Y.
26, 32-33, 43 N.E. 418, 420 (1896).
3 CPLR 7801 (1981). Certiorari requires that the determination under review must be
final, see Rubano v. New York Tel. Co., 43 Misc. 2d 149, 150-51, 250 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1964), and that there are no other adequate remedies, see
Schulman v. McMorran, 9 App. Div. 2d 1007, 1008, 195 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (3d Dep't 1959); An-
derson v. Lockhardt, 62 Misc. 2d 815, 816, 310 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1970). Mandamus to review also presupposes that the petitioner has exhausted all
administrative remedies. See Van Patten v. Ingraham, 51 Misc. 2d 244, 246-47, 272
N.Y.S.2d 943, 945-46 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1966); Gross v. Board of Educ., 46 Misc. 2d
987, 990, 261 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
4 See Cohoes Memorial Hosp. v. Department of Health, 48 N.Y.2d 583, 588-91, 399
N.E.2d 1132, 1135-36, 424 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (1979); Howe Ave. Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Nafus, 54 App. Div. 2d 686, 687, 387 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273-74 (2d Dep't 1976); In re Feldman,
28 App. Div. 2d 1106, 1106-07, 284 N.Y.S.2d 335, 335 (1st Dep't 1967); Anderson v.
Lockhardt, 62 Misc. 2d 815, 816, 310 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1970).
" Conversion is mandated by CPLR 103(c) and is designed to protect the petitioner
from dismissal of his suit for specifying the wrong type of civil judicial proceeding. THIRD
REP. at 47; SIEGEL § 563, at 788. Prior to enactment of the CPLR, a claim would be dis-
missed when the petitioner incorrectly chose between a special proceeding and an action.
See WK&M 103.08, at 1-61, 1-62. CPLR 103(c), however, provides the court with the
flexibility to issue any order that will permit proper litigation of the suit. See First Nat'l
City Bank v. City of New York Fin. Admin., 36 N.Y.2d 87, 94, 324 N.E.2d 861, 865, 365
N.Y.S.2d 493, 498 (1975); Phalen v. Theatrical Protective Union No. 1, 22 N.Y.2d 34, 41, 238
N.E.2d 295, 299, 290 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968); County of Rens-
selaer v. Capital Dist. Transp. Auth., 42 App. Div. 2d 445, 447, 349 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22-23 (3d
Dep't 1973).
6 52 N.Y.2d 88, 417 N.E.2d 533, 436 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1981), modifying 74 App. Div. 2d 30,
426 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2d Dep't 1980).
7 Id. at 98, 417 N.E.2d at 538, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
SId.
N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 220 (McKinney 1971) provides for a Public Health Council
(PHC). One of the primary duties of the PHC is to approve the establishment of hospitals.
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had conditionally approved the petitioner's application to establish
a hospital, subject to the petitioner obtaining proper financing.10
After the petitioner had secured funding," the PHC reevaluated
the public need for the hospital and disapproved the application.
12
Subsequently, the petitioner brought an article 78 proceeding,
seeking to enjoin the PHC from reconsidering its earlier determi-
nation. s Denying the petitioner's request, the trial court held that
the PHC could reevaluate its initial approval because that ap-
proval was not final.14 The Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, upon recognizing the nonfinal nature of the PHC's determi-
nation,' 5 held that the PHC's reconsideration more properly could
be reviewed under the Public Health Law and converted the suit
into an action for injunctive relief under that statute.'8 The appel-
late division also overruled the trial court's refusal to grant an in-
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-a (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1980-1981).
-0 52 N.Y.2d at 91, 417 N.E.2d at 534, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 240. The petitioner had sought
to build a 220 bed hospital in Suffolk County. Id. The original determination, made in 1972,
was based upon the PHC's finding that there existed a public need for the hospital. 74 App.
Div. 2d at 32, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
11 74 App. Div. 2d at 32, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
12 52 N.Y.2d at 91-92, 417 N.E.2d at 535, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 241. During the summer of
1976, the Department of Health's Bureau of Facility and Service Review (the Bureau) re-
viewed all pending hospital projects, including the petitioner's. 74 App. Div. 2d at 32-33, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 554. On December 16, 1976, the PHC received a report from the Bureau stating
that there was no longer any public need for the petitioner's hospital. 52 N.Y.2d at 91, 417
N.E.2d at 534, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 240. Subsequently, the petitioner met with a subcommittee
of the New York State Hospital Review and Planning Council to discuss the status of the
hospital. Id. at 91, 417 N.E.2d at 534-35, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 240-41. Thereafter, the subcom-
mittee recommended disapproval of the petitioner's application in light of the surplus of
hospital beds that the hospital's construction would cause. Id. In response, on April 22,
1977, the PHC passed a resolution which stated that it was considering disapproval of the
petitioner's application. Id. at 92, 417 N.E.2d at 535, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 241. The PHC in-
formed the petitioner that its decision would become final unless the petitioner requested a
hearing within 20 days. Id. The hearing, however, was held in abeyance pending a decision
in the petitioner's lawsuit. Id.
13 52 N.Y.2d at 92, 417 N.E.2d at 535, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
"4 Id. The court refused to estop the PHC from acting, noting that the petitioner had
been aware of the provisional nature of the determination. Id.
15 74 App. Div. 2d at 34, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 555. The court noted that the PHC's decision
was not final since the resolution stated that the PHC was only "considering" disapproval
and that such a decision would become final if the petitioner did not request a hearing
within 20 days. Id.
16 74 App. Div. 2d at 34, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 555. The appellate division questioned
whether the PHC's decision was reviewable under article 78 since it was a conditional deter-
mination and not a final order. Id. Additionally, the appellate division stated that the legis-
lative intent of Public Health Law section 2801-c was for injunctive relief to be obtainable
whenever rights granted under the statute were violated. 74 App. Div. 2d at 34, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 555.
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junction, stating that although the PHC had the power to recon-
sider the application, the petitioner's reliance upon the PHC's
initial approval warranted estopping such reconsideration."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the order of the ap-
pellate division.18 Writing for the majority,19 Judge Jasen noted
that since the contested agency action was discretionary, the peti-
tioner's article 78 proceeding was in the nature of mandamus to
review.20 Holding that an estoppel claim would not change the na-
ture of the proceeding to mandamus to compel, the Court stated
that the proper focus should be upon the character of the con-
tested agency action and not upon the petitioner's "substantive en-
titlement to prevail. ' 21 Because the contested agency action was
nonfinal and the relief sought was in the nature of mandamus to
review, the Court concluded that the PHC determination was not
'7 74 App Div. 2d at 34-35, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56. The appellate division noted that
during the provisional period, the petitioner allegedly spent $1.5 million towards the estab-
lishment of the hospital, id. at 33, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 554, and that such expenditures were
made in reasonable reliance upon the approval of petitioner's application, the time limits
within which petitioner had to comply, and the "affirmative encouragement" that the peti-
tioner had received from the PHC. Id. at 34-35, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56. In using. an estoppel
theory, the appellate division relied upon Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
38 N.Y.2d 662, 345 N.E.2d 561, 382 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1976); 74 App. Div. 2d at 34-35, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 555, wherein the Court of Appeals had applied the doctrine of estoppel to a
municipality. 38 N.Y.2d at 668, 345 N.E.2d at 564, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21. But see note 23
infra.
1s 52 N.Y.2d at 93, 417 N.E.2d at 536, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 242. See Siegel v. Mangan, 258
App. Div. 448, 450, 16 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 557, 27 N.E.2d 280
(1940) (per curiam); note 23 infra.
19 Judge Jasen was joined by Judges Jones, Wachtler and Fuchsberg. Dissenting in
part, Judge Gabrielli authored an opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke and Judge Meyer
concurred.
20 52 N.Y.2d at 96-97, 417 N.E.2d at 537-38, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 243-44; see notes 1 & 3
supra.
21 52 N.Y.2d at 97, 417 N.E.2d at 538, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 244. In discussing the discretion-
ary nature of the PHC's action, the majority referred to Utica Cheese, Inc. v. Barber, 49
N.Y.2d 1028, 406 N.E.2d 1342, 429 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1980), a case relied upon by the dissent. In
Utica Cheese, the petitioner brought an article 78 proceeding to compel an administrative
agency to render a decision upon the petitioner's application for a milk dealer's license. Id.
In granting the petitioner relief in the form of mandamus to compel, the Court held that the
agency had a nondiscretionary duty to act upon the application. Id. at 1029, 406 N.E.2d at
1343, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 406. In Hamptons' Hospital, the Court noted that Utica Cheese was
inapplicable to the facts at bar. 52 N.Y.2d at 96 n.3, 417 N.E.2d at 537 n.3, 436 N.Y.S.2d at
243 n.3. The Court stated that Utica Cheese involved the nondiscretionary duty of render-
ing a decision upon an application, whereas the petitioner in Hamptons' Hospital sought to
review the actual decision itself. Id. Such a decision, the Hamptons' Hospital Court stated,
was purely discretionary. Id.
19811
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ripe for judicial review under article 78,22 but approved the conver-
sion of the proceeding into a suit for injunctive relief under the
Public Health Law.23 Nonetheless, upon sanctioning conversion of
the proceeding, the Court held that it would not enjoin the PHC
from acting since it was, in effect, "the State acting in a govern-
mental capacity."2
Dissenting in part, Judge Gabrielli agreed that the PHC could
reconsider its decision before granting final approval, but main-
tained that the article 78 proceeding should not have been con-
verted into a suit for injunctive relief under the Public Health
Law.25 Noting that the original petition alleged that the PHC de-
22 52 N.Y.2d at 97, 417 N.E.2d at 538, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
23 Id. at 97-98, 417 N.E.2d at 538, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 244. The Court noted that nothing in
the Public Health Law's legislative history or language denied the right of aggrieved parties
to enjoin violations by the PHC. Id. The Court further stated that although the controversy
was not ripe for judicial review under article 78, it was ripe under the Public Health Law.
Id. See N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 2801-c (McKinney 1977); note 25 infra. But see note 28
infra.
24 52 N.Y.2d at 93, 417 N.E.2d at 536, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 242. It is a general rule in New
York that a state agency acting in a governmental capacity may not be precluded from such
activity on the basis of equitable estoppel. See People v. System Properties, Inc., 281 App.
Div. 433, 441, 120 N.Y.S.2d 269, 276 (3d Dep't 1953), modified on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d
330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957); State v. New York Tariff Bureau, Inc., 48
Misc. 2d 225, 229-32, 264 N.Y.S.2d 931, 938-40 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). The Hamp-
tons' Hospital Court, in applying this general rule, distinguished the case at bar from
Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662, 345 N.E.2d 561, 382
N.Y.S.2d 18 (1976). 52 N.Y.2d at 93 n.1, 417 N.E.2d at 536 n.1, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 242 n.1; see
note 16 supra. The Hamptons' Hospital Court stated that:
[Although in Bender] we held that ... the doctrine of equitable estoppel might
be invoked to permit the filing of notices of claim nunc pro tunc under section 50-
3 of the General Municipal Law during a period of particular confusion incident
to the transfer of operational control of municipal hospitals, . . . [t]hat holding,
addressed to an unusual factual situation, is of very limited application and
should not be read as diminishing the vitality of the general rule that the doctrine
of estoppel is not applicable to agencies of the State acting in a governmental
capacity.
52 N.Y.2d at 93 n.1, 417 N.E.2d at 536 n.1., 436 N.Y.S.2d at 242 n.1.
25 52 N.Y.2d at 98, 417 N.E.2d at 538, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 244. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in
part). The dissent found the conversion particularly objectionable because it was the first
time that a private health service was able to use Public Health Law section 2801-c to enjoin
a state agency. 52 N.Y.2d at 101, 417 N.E.2d at 540, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting in part). Judge Gabrielli noted that, previously, section 2801-c had been used
only to enjoin hospitals from violating article 28 of the Public Health Law. Id. (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting in part). See, e.g., Cohoes Memorial Hosp. v. Department of Health, 48 N.Y.2d
583, 588, 399 N.E.2d 1132, 1134, 424 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (1979); Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 39
N.Y.2d 339, 346, 348 N.E.2d 547, 553, 384 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (1976); People v. Wickersham
Women's Medical Center, 69 Misc. 2d 196, 196-98, 329 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628-30 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1972). Indeed, the dissent stated that there was nothing in the statute's language or
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termination was nondiscretionary, the dissent reasoned that the
petitioner's allegation constituted a prayer for relief in the nature
of mandamus to compel and therefore was reviewable under article
78.26 Moreover, Judge Gabrielli declared that if such review were
subject to the finality requirement as is a claim in the nature of
mandamus to review, the petitioner's suit should have been dis-
missed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 27 Contend-
ing that the conversion to the Public Health Law was used because
the petitioner could not meet the finality requirement, the dissent
concluded that the majority's holding was "wholly inappropriate"
and logically inconsistent.28
Hamptons' Hospital illustrates the difficulty courts face in
distinguishing among the different writs. Indeed, whether the relief
sought by the Hamptons' Hospital petitioner was in the nature of
mandamus to review or mandamus to compel was a pivotal point
of disagreement between the majority and dissent.29 It is submit-
ted that in characterizing the petitioner's requested relief as in the
nature of mandamus to review, the majority correctly focused upon
the character of the contested agency activity and not, as the dis-
sent preferred, upon the writ asserted by the petitioner.30 Although
legislative history which even implied that injunctive relief could be obtained against the
PHC. 52 N.Y.2d at 102, 417 N.E.2d at 540, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in
part).
'6 52 N.Y.2d at 101, 417 N.E.2d at 540, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in
part). The petitioner contended that the PHC had no discretion once it had made a deter-
mination and had induced the petitioner to rely upon it. Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in
part). The dissent stated that the petition for relief, therefore, was in the nature of manda-
mus to compel. Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part). Noting that mandamus to compel does
not require a final decision, the dissent concluded that the finality bar, which had been the
basis for the appellate division's conversion, was nonexistent. Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in
part). Although noting that the PHC's "ultimate determination" was discretionary, the dis-
sent felt that this was irrelevant to the issue of conversion. Id. at 101 n.2, 417 N.E.2d at 540
n.2, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 246 n.2 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part). Rather, the dissent argued,
the pertinent issue was whether the PHC should be enjoined from making a redetermina-
tion. Id. at 103-04, 417 N.E.2d at 541, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
The dissent concluded that conversion was unnecessary because this type of review is en-
compassed within the scope of article 78. Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
27 Id. at 103, 417 N.E.2d at 541, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 247. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
28 Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part). The dissent stated that if administrative action
is not ripe for article 78 review it cannot be ripe for review under the Public Health Law. Id.
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
"I See 52 N.Y.2d at 97, 417 N.E.2d at 537-38, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 243-44; id. at 101, 417
N.E.2d at 540, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
10 The majority stated that "It]he availability under article 78 of mandamus to compel
performance of a duty by an administrative agency depends not on the applicant's substan-
tive entitlement to prevail, but on the nature of the duty sought to be commanded-i.e.,
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persons may compel the performance of ministerial acts through
mandamus to compel, an assertion of reliance has no bearing with
respect to nonfinal action and should not be used to convert a dis-
cretionary act into a ministerial duty.31 Consequently, because the
contested agency action in Hamptons' Hospital was nonfinal and
the relief sought was in the nature of mandamus to review, the
majority properly held that relief could not be obtained under arti-
cle 78.32
Furthermore, although CPLR 103(c) authorizes conversion
when the relief sought by the petitioner is unavailable,33 it appears
that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies prohibits resort to the
Public Health Law when agency action is nonfinal because the
Public Health Law does not provide for judicial review of agency
action, whether final or nonfinal5 4 Indeed, although conversion
from article 78 to an alternative basis for relief is proper in some
instances, 3 it is submitted that the Hamptons' Hospital Court
mandatory, nondiscretionary action." Id. at 97, 417 N.E.2d at 538, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 244; see
New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 683-84, 143 N.E.2d 256, 259, 163 N.Y.S.2d
409, 413-14 (1957); Weinstein v. New York City Transit Auth., 49 Misc. 2d 170, 172-73, 267
N.Y.S.2d 111, 113-14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
31 Before a writ of mandamus to compel will issue, the duty involved clearly must be
ministerial. See Koffler v. Weiss, 48 Misc. 2d 1, 2, 263 N.Y.S.2d 905, 907 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1965); Petz v. Property Clerk of the 68th Squad, 149 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180-81 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1956). This ministerial duty must be grounded in the law. As the Court of
Appeals has stated, "[miandamus [to compel] is used to enforce an administrative act posi-
tively required to be done by a provision of law." Walsh v. LaGuardia, 269 N.Y. 437, 441,
199 N.E. 652, 653 (1936). It is submitted that estoppel cannot suffice as an act "positively
required" by law since "estoppel does not originate a legal right; it merely forbids the denial
of a right claimed otherwise to have arisen." Ossining v. Lakin, 5 Misc. 2d 1024, 1026, 160
N.Y.S. 1012, 1014 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957) (quoting Morill Realty Corp. v.
Rayon Holding Corp., 254 N.Y. 268, 275, 172 N.E. 494, 496 (1930)).
32 See 52 N.Y.2d at 97-98, 417 N.E.2d at 538, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 244; notes 21-23 and
accompanying text supra.
11 See Adams v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 51 App. Div. 2d 668, 668, 378
N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (4th Dep't 1976); Taubman Co., Inc. v. Getty Square Plaza Corp., 76
Misc. 2d 476, 478-79, 351 N.Y.S.2d 125, 128 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County), affd, 46 App.
Div. 2d 1016, 364 N.Y.S.2d 808 (2d Dep't 1974); Avalon East, Inc. v. Monaghan, 43 Misc. 2d
401, 404-05, 251 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964); note 5 supra.
:, See note 25 and accompanying text supra. The courts have noted that, in general,
the judiciary's ability to review administrative action is limited. E.g., Holland v. Edwards,
282 App. Div. 353, 358-59, 122 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725-26 (1st Dep't 1953), af'd, 307 N.Y. 38, 119
N.E.2d 581 (1954); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Department of
Labor, 17 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 182 N.Y.S.2d 570, 574 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959); New
York City Hous. Auth. v. Watson, 23 Misc. 2d 408, 414, 189 N.Y.S.2d 274, 279-80 (Mun. Ct.
N.Y. County 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 27 Misc. 2d 618, 207 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1960).
3 See notes 5 & 33 supra. The critical focus for the courts should be whether the peti-
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should not have sanctioned conversion into a cause of action under
the Public Health Law, since that statute was intended to provide
"a remedy only against hospitals," not against the PHC.36 More-
over, it is suggested that when final agency action is required but
lacking, such as in Hamptons' Hospital, the Court should forego
conversion in favor of remanding to the agency for a final deci-
sion. 7 Such a judicial posture would most effectively discourage
future petitioners from filing suit prior to the making of a final
administrative determination.
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tioner has stated a viable cause of action and not whether the wrong form of relief has been
asserted. See Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 321, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (1st Dep't
1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560, 418 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979); Coughlin v. Festin, 53
App. Div. 2d 800, 800-01, 385 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168-69 (3d Dep't 1976). Indeed, if a petitioner
presents a prayer for relief which is within the court's jurisdiction, it is incumbent upon the
court to convert the action. CPLR 103(c). See Phalen v. Theatrical Protective Union No. 1,
22 N.Y.2d 34, 41-42, 238 N.E.2d 295, 299, 290 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000
(1968); Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga County Water Auth., 29 App. Div. 2d 1042, 1042-
43, 289 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876-77 (4th Dep't 1968), modified on other grounds, 24 N.Y.2d 400,
248 N.E.2d 855, 301 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1969); Barile v. City Comptroller, 56 Misc. 2d 190, 193, 288
N.Y.S.2d 191, 195 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1968). Thus, when suits brought under article 78
sound in the nature of injunctive relief, courts generally have permitted conversion from
article 78 in an effort to preserve the claims. See Moss v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 61
App. Div. 2d 545, 548, 403 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (3d Dep't 1978); Haroche v. Leary, 64 Misc. 2d
191, 194, 314 N.Y.S.2d 553, 557 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970), afl'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 972,
331 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1972); Kraemer v. Office of Employee Relations, 63 Misc. 2d
708, 709, 313 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1970).
36 52 N.Y.2d at 102, 417 N.E.2d at 540, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in
part) (emphasis added); see note 24 supra.
37 It is submitted that the Hamptons' Hospital Court would have been well advised to
remand the petitioner's proceeding to the PHC for final agency action. Indeed, CPLR 7806
provides that courts "may dismiss ... proceeding[s] either on the merits or with leave to
renew." CPLR 7806 (McKinney 1981). As noted by Professor Siegel, CPLR 7806 gives
courts:
the requisite power to render any judgment appropriate to the case .... [I]f the
case entails ... the necessity of further proceedings by the respondent agency,
the correction will be made and back will go the case. Though not expressly listed,
a remand to the agency for further proceedings is very much a part of the court's
power.
SIEGEL § 570, at 799-800.
